Russian war fever: Will it spread? (Part 2)

By guest author Alfred L. McAlister, Ph.D.

Part 1 of this series addressed the current crisis in Crimea from the perspective of the ploys used to gain popular support for military aggression. These include:

Map of Ukraine with Crimea highlighted
Map of Ukraine with Crimea highlighted. Image (map) by Sven Teschke, from Wikimedia Commons. Used under CC Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license.
  • Invocation of a moral obligation
  • Advantageous comparisons with worse actions by other nations, and
  • The demonization of enemies.

Let’s hope that history does not repeat itself now–that Western leaders don’t invoke debatable moral justifications for a military response to the crisis in Crimea, such as the need to preserve national reputation, prove the strength of our resolution to defend freedom abroad, or to punish Russian misdeeds to make an example that will deter acts of aggression elsewhere.

Let’s hope we don’t hear palliative contrasts between Western-led multilateral military action and Russia’s unilateral move, or portrayals of Russians as bestial characters only able to understand force as a means of negotiation.

If we do hear those kinds of arguments for an aggressive response to the conflict in Crimea, let’s be prepared to reject them. Let’s make peaceful negotiation backed by economic sanctions, no matter how long it takes or imperfect the results, the only option we accept for resolving international conflict unless our national interests are gravely and immediately threatened.

By anticipating the ways of thinking that spread war fever, we can “inoculate” ourselves against them and begin to make popular support for offensive warfare by democratic nations–like ancient plagues–a part of our past and not our future.

Dr. Alfred McAlister’s essay, “War Fever: How Can We Resist?” will be published this spring in the International Handbook of Negotiation and Mediation, edited by Mauro Gallucio (Berlin: Springer).