Does Nonviolent Resistance Work? Part 3c

This is the third of three posts comprising Part III of a series of posts in which Dr. Ian Hansen shares his thoughts on nonviolence.

See also Part 1aPart 1bPart 1cPart 2aPart 2bPart2cPart3a and Part3b.

At the end of my last post, I raised the issue of nations for which the original relations of domination grew even more entrenched after a nonviolent revolution. This is arguably the case with the Palestinians, as Dr. Wasfi noted in the comment inspiring this series of posts.

The first Palestinian Intifada was, for the most part, somewhere between nonviolent and low technology violent (throwing stones). Needless to say, Israeli soldiers did not restrict themselves to throwing stones when trying to suppress the intifada—so it could at least be called a “less violent” revolution than the means of suppression employed against it. And though the Intifada generated a lot more international sympathy than, say, murdering Olympic athletes in Munich did, it still did not get Palestinians a real state, and the resulting Oslo accords were largely seen as a cruel joke from the Palestinian perspective.

Again, it is difficult to tease out cause and effect here since nonviolence and violence have co-occurred in the Palestinian field of resistance over the decades (and, as Dr. Wasfi said in her comment, this is usually the case in most, if not all, historical mass uprisings). However, in cases where nonviolence has been the primary strategy used by Palestinians–as in the West Bank village of Budrus–it seems that the ability to resist land grabs and other acts of oppression is potentially very reliable. (I highly recommend Julia Bacha’s documentary on the Budrus, previewed at the beginning of this post. It is one of the better films about any nonviolent campaign). I haven’t seen any studies that systematically compare the goal-achieving success of relatively violent and relatively nonviolent acts of resistance village-by-village in Palestine, but this is a low hanging fruit for any sociologist of the region.

Ian Hansen, Ph.D., is an assistant professor in the Department of Behavioral Sciences at York College, City University of New York. His research focuses in part on how witness for human rights and peace can transcend explicit political ideology. He is also on the Steering Committee for Psychologists for Social Responsibility.

“Humanitarian intervention?” Imperialism still stinks, Part 4

Final in the series by guest author Dr. Dahlia Wasfi

Gaza libera. Free Palestine
Photo from WikiMedia Commons, used under CC Attribution 2.0 Generic license.

The people of lands whose riches are coveted by imperial powers must endure an almost constant battle among those vying for external control. In addition, they must bear the burden of indigenous struggle for independence. Such is the history of much of Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Such is the root of much of the conflict in the Middle East today.

The colonial state of Israel continues to expand its borders with illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank. Israeli government maps suggest planned annexation of the majority of this land. Through their expulsion from the 1940s through today, Palestinians remain the largest refugee population in the world.

Countries like Iraq, Libya, and Syria finally gained their independence from foreign powers and took control of their oil industries. Along with Iran (following the Islamic revolution in 1979), these three countries were the major forces countering Western hegemony in the region. But those Western powers—and their multinational corporations—want their profitable colonial relationship back.

In the early 20th century, to honor “the spirit of the age” of national independence[1], the imperialists called their colonial possessions “mandates.” Now in the early 21st century, imperialists—armed with far more advanced weapons technologies—call their re-domination of these countries “humanitarian intervention for regime change.” These imperialists  claim that we must save the indigenous people in the Middle East from their states, in particular, from the use of weapons of mass destruction by local powers.

Those claims proved false in Iraq and remain unproven in Syria. In Iraq and Libya, the people are much worse off today than before our “humanitarian interventions” via military assault. Bombing raids and the subsequent replacement of secular states with theocracies have resulted in death, destruction, and further loss of freedoms for the survivors. As Western oil companies and military industries reap the profits, the parasitic colonial relationships are re-established.

No matter what euphemism our government uses for its policy, it’s still imperialism. And it still stinks.


[1] Owen, Roger. “State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 3rd Edition.” Routledge, New York. 2004. p.6

 

Nothing but a euphemism (Imperialism still stinks, Part 3)

Third in a series by guest author Dr. Dahlia Wasfi

League of Nations logo.
Image in public domain.

At the end of World War I in 1918, the Arab peoples (including Iraqis, Syrians, and Palestinians) triumphantly declared their liberation from colonial rule according to their pre-war agreements with the Allied powers. However, as a result of the Sykes-Picot pact, the Balfour Declaration, and the newly formed League of Nations, these lands remained under foreign control (albeit a different foreign power).

The League of Nations was created in 1919 for the purpose of preventing another world war. Even though one of its founding principles was the concept of national self-determination, the League rejected Arab declarations of sovereignty. Subsequently, at the 1920 Conference of San Remo[1], France obtained mandates over Syria and Lebanon, while the British gained Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq[2].

The “mandates” in the Arab World were commissions from the League of Nations that authorized France and Great Britain to govern over each region. From the British perspective, the mandates were distinct from the exploitative colonialism of the previous era because of the League’s requirement for a local constitutional government. The Crown considered the mandate concept as a transitional stage towards Arab autonomy, reflecting “the spirit of the age” of national independence[3].

For the indigenous peoples, however, the term “mandate” was nothing more than a euphemism for imperialism—and their continued subjugation.

The peoples’ anger spawned massive independence movements against their new rulers.  They had bled and died fighting the Ottomans for their liberation. Through the mid- and later 20th century, they would fight the British, French, and other colonial powers who had betrayed them.


[1] Munier, Gilles. “Iraq: An Illustrated History and Guide.” Interlink Books,  Northampton. 2004. p.32

[2] Owen, Roger. “State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 3rd Edition.” Routledge, New York. 2004. p.6

[3] Ibid

Established as a colonial state (Imperialism still stinks, Part 2)

Second in a series by guest author Dr. Dahlia Wasfi

Palestinian refugees, 1948
Palestinian refugees, 1948. Photo by Fred Csasznik, in public domain.

In 1917, as the Allies (with the help of the Arabs) were rallying to win World War I, the British government issued the Balfour Declaration.

This decree regarding a Jewish home in Palestine was named for Arthur James Balfour, Britain’s foreign secretary. Balfour had been strongly influenced by British Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann since their initial meeting in 1906. Though most leaders of British Jewry at the time were opposed to a Jewish homeland in Palestine, Weizmann—considered to be one of the fathers of the Zionist movement—garnered Balfour’s support for the Zionist agenda.[1]

The very brief Declaration stated:

“His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”

The British had not yet taken control of the Holy Land, but that didn’t stop them from promising its future to both the indigenous Palestinians and the global Jewish population.

In 1917, less than ten percent of the inhabitants of Palestine were Jews[2]—many of whom were recent immigrants brought by the Zionist movement between 1905 and 1914.[3]  No one had asked the more than 90 percent “existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” if the creation of a “national home” on their land—which excluded them—was acceptable.  Israel was established as a colonial settler state.


[1] Shlaim, Avi 6/27/09

[2] Ibid

[3] Neff, Donald. “Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days That Changed the Middle East.” Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, New York. 1984.  p.21