Violating human rights agreements

The United States’ “War on Terror” and involvement in Iraq have renewed questions concerning human rights agreements and international treaties. Do nations ever have the right to violate or ignore these agreements? What conditions are seen as justifying a breech? These were the questions addressed in a study by GIPGAP in 2005.

Declaration of Human Rights, French painting
Declaration of Human Rights, France 1789. Image in public domain.

A sample of 518 participants (253 females and 218 males), at least 20 percent of whom were college students, completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Scale (PAIRTAPS), which includes the following item: “Sometimes a country has the right to ignore international treaties or international human rights agreements.”

Participants were asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree) the extent to which they agreed with the statement, and then to explain the reasoning behind their rating scale score.

Analyses revealed that most participants could be divided into two groups:

  • Opposers—i.e., respondents who argued that governments do not have the right to violate or ignore agreements
  • Justifiers—i.e., participants who argued governments sometimes do have such a right.

Of the 518 respondents, significantly more opposed violations than justified them, but opposers and justifiers used the same types of arguments to support their positions.

For example, both opposers and justifiers appealed to characteristics of treaties to justify their scores, with opposers arguing that agreements should be respected and justifiers arguing that agreements could be ignored if they were impractical, obsolete, or unjust.

Similarly, both opposers and justifiers emphasized the positive effects and the greater good that would come from adopting their position. For instance, one opposer wrote “These treaties are for the greater good of mankind,” while one justifier wrote “Sometimes you have to ignore your morals for the good of mankind.”

What do you think about these findings? Can you think of other situations where people argue passionately in favor of two opposing positions using the exact same type of argument—e.g., “My way is more moral/more intelligent/more practical, etc. than yours”?

Why might this be? What might be done to help opponents get beyond endless debate?

Kathie Malley-Morrison, Professor of Psychology

Note: This post is based on the study “Attitudes toward international treaties and human rights agreements” by Kyleen Hashim and  Kathleen Malley-Morrison, published in the journal Peace Psychology, Spring/Summer 2007.

 

What is a “just” war? (Just war, Part 1)

Judge's gavel
Photo by Avjoska (Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported; from Wikimedia Commons)

[Note from Kathie Malley-Morrison: Today we welcome the first of several contributions by our guest contributor Michael Corgan. Dr. Corgan is Associate Chair of International Relations and Associate Professor of International Relations at Boston University. He is a specialist in international security, Icelandic government, and American governmental institutions. He has extensive government service in political and military planning (especially NATO) and is a media analyst on security and political affairs. He has collaborated with me on several research projects concerned with perspectives on war and peace. His most recent book is Iceland and Its Alliances: Security for a Small State (2002).]

What makes a war “just”?  Is a just war also a “legal” war?  Understanding the distinction is important as we begin to explore the topic of just war in this series of posts.

As generally accepted, just war theory imposes six criteria for identifying a war as just:

  1. The war must have a just cause
  2. It must be initiated by a proper authority
  3. It must be a last resort
  4. The use of force must be proportional to the object to be achieved
  5. There must be a chance of success when one uses force; and
  6. The ensuing peace, if attained, must also be just.

It is the first criterion, just cause, that leads to the tension between legal war and just war.

As defined in international treaties, war is legal only if it used in self-defense (of one’s self or others). Just war theory, however, goes beyond the legal mandate and seems to permit an additional use of force–specifically in the case of what we nowadays call humanitarian intervention.

Consider the wars with which you are familiar:

  • To what extent were they initiated for a just cause?
  • In which cases did the initiators claim a just cause that later proved to be not the real cause for the attack on another land?

In the next post on just war, we will give further consideration to the notion of humanitarian intervention as a justification for a “just” war.

Michael T. Corgan, Associate Chair and Associate Professor of International Relations, Boston University